Abstract: To contribute significantly to environmental policy of the next century, conservationists will need to reach a consensus on their fundamental values and goals and to persuade society to adopt them. Resolution of the debate over the continued role of naturalness as a guiding concept has important implications for how conservation is practiced and the future of the discipline. I examine five aspects of naturalness in the context of biological conservation: (1) its utility, (2) its assessment, (3) its relation to values and ethics, (4) alternative imperatives, and (5) 
Introduction
The biosphere is being affected profoundly by its 6 billion or so humans (Vitousek et al. 1997) . Environmental issues are not merely about undesirable anthropogenic effects; they are also about the sort of earth or nature society wants (Clark 1989; Ferkiss 1993) . Self-conscious, cooperative, and forward-thinking management of global resources is a new, immense challenge to humanity. Conservation biologists prefer that in the future the earth retain most of its biotic diversity, a scenario that is unlikely without fundamental changes in the prevailing relationship between humans and nature. To be effective, conservation biologists will need to frankly acknowledge crucial values, consistently incorporate those values into management actions, and, ultimately, persuade many people outside the discipline to adopt these values.
A key value-laden and potentially divisive issue recently surfaced in this journal (Hunter 1996 (Hunter , 1997 Comer 1997; Haila 1997) : the role of naturalness in guiding conservation. Hunter (1996) primarily intended "to clarify the definition of natural as it is commonly used in ecological literature" and as it relates to activities of primitive, indigenous people. The relevance of naturalness to conservation was ancillary, but Hunter proposed that a "general goal. . .would be to move ecosystems along the continuum toward the natural pole." But Haila and Comer focused on the difficulty of distinguishing natural from anthropogenic and argued that naturalness has little utility in guiding conservation. Moreover, they asserted that all human activities are natural. Hunter (1997) addressed the semantics of the exchange but skirted the most substantive issues raised, including (1) the utility of naturalness in biological conservation, (2) conservationists' conceptions of humans and nature, and (3) alternative concepts for guiding conservation. These topics are central to how conservation is conducted. Indeed, if conservation biology is to mature as a consolidated discipline, I submit that conservationists must reach a strong consensus on these philosophical underpinnings.
I use the disparate-but probably widely held-views of Hunter, Haila, and Comer as a springboard for exploring the role of naturalness in guiding conservation. First, I argue that the use of technology makes human activities unnatural and that the naturalness of ecosystems can usually be assessed objectively. Next, I review how value systems shape society's ecological behavior and discuss the changes in prevailing values and treatment of ecosystems needed to achieve conservation. Finally, I conclude that naturalness, although sometimes difficult to assess, is the most reasonable imperative for biological conservation, and I point out how it is currently applied and some implications of its adoption as a guiding concept in conservation.
Definitions
Four terms require definition: natural, naturalness, technology , and ecosystem . A thing is natural if it is not made or influenced by humans, especially by human technology. Synonyms of natural are wild or uncultivated ; antonyms are artificial or anthropogenic . This view is consistent with others (e.g., Peterken 1993; Borgman 1995; Christensen et al. 1996; Hunter 1996) but does not imply that humans are inherently unnatural. For example, childbirth is "natural" when it occurs without intervention (Brennan 1988) . Human activity becomes unnatural when it involves technology. Hunting and gathering unassisted by tools are natural, but because all human societies use technology this is an irrelevant case. Human activities that exceed our genetically evolved-as opposed to culturally evolved-abilities are unnatural; such activities, which include agriculture and transportation, rely on technology. We do not merely live in ecosystems; we use technology to dramatically al-ter their physical structure, organizing processes, and biotic composition. Naturalness, the degree to which a thing is natural, is represented by a continuous gradient between extremes of entirely natural and entirely artificial. The extremes are only abstractions. Entirely natural areas no longer exist, but some areas clearly are more natural than others (e.g., unplowed prairie versus cattle pasture versus shopping mall).
Technology encompasses all the machinery and methods used by humans to provide their wants. It includes simple and sophisticated tools (e.g., stone ax, airplane) and the harnessing of natural processes (e.g., fire, flowing water). Some nonhuman species use technology (e.g., beaver, chimpanzee), but their capacity for causing environmental change is too limited to be important to conservation. In contrast, human technology is responsible for major losses of biotic diversity. "Western" (European) cultures have led the charge to conquer and transform nature via technology, especially since the Industrial Revolution (Ferkiss 1993) . In the United States, technology is no longer just a means to secure needed ends (e.g., food, shelter); technology acquisition (e.g., vehicles, gadgets) is an end in itself. Although all technology has ecological effects, I focus on industrial-scale, western-style technology because it is the most pervasive globally and perhaps the most pernicious biotically.
I use the word ecosystem generically, without implying a particular spatiotemporal scale or emphasizing energy and material fluxes. I follow Angermeier and Karr (1994) in not distinguishing community and ecosystem as different levels of ecological organization, but rather as complementary views of the same system.
Distinctions between Natural and Anthropogenic Features
For naturalness to be a useful concept, natural and anthropogenic features of ecosystems must be consistently distinguishable. Conservationists rarely state explicit criteria for naturalness, however. Anderson (1991) proposed three criteria for ecosystem naturalness: (1) degree of change expected if humans were removed, (2) amount of cultural energy required to sustain the current state, and (3) native species still present. I propose four criteria for the naturalness of anthropogenic alterations to ecosystems: (1) degree of change, (2) degree of sustained control, (3) spatial extent of change, and (4) abruptness of change; each criterion is inversely related to naturalness. The first criterion in both lists refers to opposing changes along the same ecological trajectory. The second criterion in both lists refers to chronic effects, but I also account for effects that persist without inputs of cultural energy, such as dams, introduced species, and severe pollution. My last two criteria reflect the typical disparity in spatiotemporal scales over which natural and anthropogenic disturbances occur.
No single criterion is infallible in distinguishing natural and anthropogenic conditions. Tidal waves can cause large-scale, sudden, and dramatic ecological changes, but they exercise no sustained control over the changes. Beaver dams can cause sudden, dramatic, and sustained changes in a stream, but effects are small in scale relative to most human dams. Although all human modifications to ecosystems are unnatural, my criteria would show that some are less natural than others (e.g., building cities versus herding free-ranging livestock).
Ecosystem naturalness is a function of naturalness at multiple levels of organization. One might ask whether an individual is a natural member of a population (cultured versus wild), whether a population is a natural component of a community (introduced versus native), or whether a community naturally occurs in a landscape (maintained via natural versus anthropogenic disturbance). The naturalness of higher levels of organization is an integration of naturalness at lower levels. Because the "lifespan" of biotic elements and the time frame of dynamics increases at higher levels, the historical information needed to document human effects is probably less available for those levels. For example, the naturalness of a tree could be assessed more confidently than the naturalness of a forest.
Some conservationists deny that humans are distinct from the rest of nature (regarding the debate over humannature dualism, see Callicott & Nelson 1998) . Because humans are products of evolution, our origin is undeniably natural. For Haila (1997) and Comer (1997) , our natural origin makes all activities natural and precludes distinguishing between natural and anthropogenic ecological conditions. Yet human alterations of ecosystems often exceed nonanthropogenic dynamics in degree of change, spatial extent, and abruptness (Vitousek et al. 1997) . All but the slightest alterations can reduce biotic diversity (Redford & Richter 1999) . Many anthropogenic landscapes (e.g., urban, agricultural) and artifacts (e.g., buildings, highways, dams) are distinct from the rest of nature and support strikingly little biotic diversity. Reconciling our natural genesis and unnatural ecological behavior impinges on conservation goals and requires closer examination.
Humans are cultural as well as biological animals. Our physical features (anatomy, physiology, etc.) are similar to those of many other species and developed via the same gene-based evolutionary processes. Our distinctness (as we see it) lies in our intellect, self-awareness, and spirituality, which form our culture. For conservation, the most important outgrowth of culture is technology, with which we transform nature to suit our desires, surmount our genetic limitations, and sustain our huge global population. Because technological evolu-tion is much more rapid than genetic evolution, we transform ecosystems faster than other biota can adapt, thereby causing loss of biotic diversity. Technologydriven transformations are often more rapid and extensive than natural ecological changes. For example, plant and insect assemblages of Iowa changed as dramatically following European settlement as during interglacial transitions (Baker et al. 1996) , and anthropogenic doubling of atmospheric CO 2 levels may induce climate and vegetation shifts as great as any in the paleoecologic record (Bartlein et al. 1997) . Despite the natural origin of humans, anthropogenic alterations of ecosystems, facilitated by technology but not constrained by genetic evolution, are grounds for considering human activities unnatural.
Assessing Naturalness
Some conservationists reject the assessment of naturalness as an irrelevant or arbitrary exercise. Because humans are pervasive, permanent components of ecosystems, some believe that naturalness is infeasible and therefore irrelevant to management decisions (e.g., Saberwal 1996) . Others (e.g., Comer 1997; Haila 1997) emphasize our inability to always distinguish the natural from the anthropogenic, especially when their respective processes are similar (e.g., species invasion, fire disturbance). Nevertheless, recognizing naturalness as a continuous rather than binary variable eviscerates these arguments.
Naturalness is not an all-or-nothing quality. The criteria in the preceding section could be used to rank ecosystems or human actions along a naturalness gradient. No current ecosystem is entirely natural or artificial. Atmospheric effects of human actions preclude completely natural ecosystems (McKibben 1989) . Conversely, even intensively managed ecosystems retain some naturalness. In an Iowa cornfield the soil disturbance and chemistry regimes and the biotic community are highly artificial, but many soil properties, the vast majority of corn genes, and plants' responses to light and nutrients are legacies of natural processes. Rejecting the relevance of naturalness because there are no strictly natural ecosystems discounts the value of naturally evolved components and is a bit like rejecting the existence of gray because it comprises many shades.
Ranking ecosystems by their naturalness may be imperfect but need not be arbitrary. Ecosystems are too poorly understood to allow precise measurement of all human effects, and the increasing pervasiveness of these effects will further impair our ability to distinguish natural from anthropogenic (Higgs 1991) . Nevertheless, ecosystems have functional and evolutionary limits and natural ranges of variation (Pickett et al. 1992; Pickett & Ostfeld 1995) , which provide a basis for the objective assessment of naturalness. Conservationists may disagree on what the natural range of variation is, and different views can imply different tactics (e.g., Shinneman & Baker 1997) . Because indirect or long-term natural responses (e.g., succession) to human actions (e.g., deforestation) are especially problematic for distinguishing the natural from the anthropogenic, managers should know an ecosystem's history before setting conservation goals (Motzkin et al. 1996; Harding et al. 1998) . Recent forest studies (Hardt & Swank 1997; Lindenmayer & Franklin 1997; Nowacki & Abrams 1997) illustrate how careful science can distinguish between the natural and anthropogenic features of ecosystems.
Imperfect knowledge does not justify rejection of naturalness as a conservation imperative. Governments are imperfect solutions to social strife but are preferred over anarchy. In fact, naturalness provides a clear basis for choosing among many (probably most) potential ecosystem states. Conservationists debate the naturalness of fire regimes in the North American central plains prior to European settlement, but nobody disputes that the plains ecosystem is less natural now. Even in Africa, where the natural and the anthropogenic are perhaps least distinct due to extended human occupation, current ecological changes, driven by industrial-scale technology and rapidly growing human populations, are clearly unnatural (e.g., Kaufman 1992; Jacobson et al. 1995) . Haila (1997) and some other social constructionists (e.g., Cronon 1995) maintain that humans are indistinct from nature because conceptions of nature are merely cultural constructs dependent on human understanding. Moreover, because each perceived "nature" is equally valid, no particular view has primacy for policy making. This position not only discounts our ability to use science to assess naturalness but passively allows continued erosion of biotic diversity. Although we cannot view nature except through culturally tinted lenses, it is obvious that the biotic nature left in the wake of industrialism is very different from the version(s) that might emerge in our absence.
Benchmarks for assessing naturalness ideally reflect conditions free of human influence. In practice, benchmarks usually reflect former periods with fewer humans and less destructive technology. Reference periods generally precede the onset of industrial capitalism, which heralds intensive agriculture and urbanization (Haila & Levins 1992) . The typical reference period for the western hemisphere predates European colonization, but human effects may have been lesser in 1750, a century or so after Native Americans were nearly exterminated by European diseases (Denevan 1992) . The Atlantic seaboard of North America requires an earlier reference period than the midwestern plains, which were colonized in the mid-1800s (Whitney 1994) .
To be useful in conservation, reference conditions should be documented adequately enough to guide management goals. Because documentation of ecological conditions and human effects has generally improved through history, recent reference periods often provide more practical benchmarks than older periods, even if recent conditions are less natural. For example, the first extensive survey of Virginia's freshwater fishes did not begin until 1867 ( Jenkins & Burkhead 1994) , and most regions of North America were scarcely surveyed by trained biologists before the late 1800s (Whitney 1994) , long after European colonization. The lack of a standard reference period for all ecosystems contributes to the perception that assessing naturalness is arbitrary, but conservationists can review available information to identify the most objective benchmarks. To the extent that natural conditions and our ability to manage for them are unknown, a prudent conservation strategy might be to select multiple benchmarks and apply each to its own suite of ecosystems (Hunter 1996) .
Naturalness in Conservation Ethics
The nature that society forges in the new millenium will reflect our values (Clark 1989 ). We will actively conserve only what we value highly. Values are especially prominent in conservation biology and should be stated explicitly (Barry & Oelschlaeger 1996; Lele & Norgaard 1996) . Conservation biology exists because conservationists believe that biotic diversity, ecological complexity, and evolution are intrinsically good (Soulé 1985) and ought to be conserved. It is not diversity, complexity, and evolution, per se, that warrant conservation, but natural components and levels of diversity and complexity and natural rates of evolution. The cornerstone value judgment of conservation is that naturally evolved biotic elements-genomes, communities, landscapesare fundamentally more valuable than artificial ones. Technology can create myriad new elements (i.e., more biotic diversity), but these are not as "good," and some facilitate the loss of natural elements (Angermeier 1994) . Conservation accommodates many world views (Callicott et al. 1999 ), but consensus on the supremacy of natural elements is critical to precluding certain activities (e.g., introducing species to enhance diversity) from being perceived as conservation.
Humans value ecosystems for various reasons, including extractable goods, ecological services, and beauty. Nature fills certain physical, intellectual, and spiritual needs that may be essential to human survival (Kellert 1995) . Many valued features of ecosystems derive from the natural evolution of diverse biotas and cannot be manufactured or replaced by technology. Yet many people do not appreciate the importance of native biodiversity in providing those features, and they tacitly allow loss of biodiversity. The realization that humans are less creative and powerful than the rest of nature, and ultimately dependent on natural processes (Daily 1997) , is probably the key to why conservationists value natural elements over artificial ones. Conservationists can help reestablish the connection of society to ecosystems by promoting recognition of a broad array of ecological values and their relation to natural biotas.
Value systems give rise to ethics, which guide human behavior. Just as the ethics guiding interactions between humans reflect our mutual respect, the ethics guiding our use of ecosystems reflect our respect for nature (Taylor 1981) . The intrinsic value of nature is central to many world views, including those of certain Buddhists, Christians, Deep-ecologists, and Native Americans (Ferkiss 1993) . Ethics founded on respect for nature could be a social mechanism for affirming the intrinsic value of ecosystems and limiting their alteration. Cultural differences in the permissibility of ecosystem alteration are illustrated by contrasting Native Americans and European invaders. Native Americans widely believed that all creatures were related and all natural things (living and nonliving) possessed reason, volition, and spirituality. Although conservation probably was not their conscious goal, some Native Americans exploited ecosystems less than their technology allowed because of ethical constraints on their treatment of an interrelated, animated, and spiritualized nature . In contrast, the typical European espoused exploitation and domination of ecosystems through unrestrained use of technology . This view maintained that humans are superior to the rest of nature, an especially anthropocentric interpretation of Judeo-Christian beliefs (for discussions of domination versus stewardship of nature in Judeo-Christian beliefs, see Ferkiss 1993; Dobel 1994; Merchant 1995) .
The notion of human superiority, which discounts naturalness and ignores ecological limits, still prevails in modern management of ecosystems (Ehrenfeld 1981) . The common practice of introducing species outside their native ranges reflects the agriculturist view that humans can and should improve nature (Dubos 1973) . Rather than accommodating natural ecological variation through shifts in human use, as is common among aboriginal societies (Gadgil et al. 1993) , modern institutions typically respond to ecological variation with command-and-control measures that compromise ecosystem resilience and create additional crises (Holling & Meffe 1996) . The destructiveness of such approaches is exacerbated by the escalating demand for amenities generated by excessive consumerism (Borgman 1995) .
The values underlying an effective conservation ethic would differ profoundly from those underlying the traditional European ethic of ecosystem management. When biologically destructive technology is available to billions of people, conservation (sensu Soulé 1985) becomes a pipe dream unless society imposes self-restraint motivated by respect for nature. The most important philosophical step is rejection of the irrational, chauvinistic claim that humans are inherently superior to other species (Taylor 1981) . Although humans are unique and valuable, this does not justify environmental degradation or ethical disregard for other biota (Hunter 1997) . Ironically, functioning as "just another species" requires an acute awareness of our uniqueness (i.e., technology) and its ecological ramifications. Humans behaving as distinct but unprivileged members of ecosystems is central to Leopold's (1949) land ethic, which affirms the rights of soils, waters, and biota to exist naturally.
Respect for nature is more important to a conservation ethic than the distinction between humans as apart from or as a part of nature. Either view can be "spun" to support short-term exploitation of ecosystems and longterm erosion of biotic diversity. For example, some social constructionists do not distinguish humans from nature and thereby justify any ecological behavior (Soulé & Lease 1995) . Conversely, Judeo-Christians believe that they hold dominion over nature, which also obviates constraints on ecological behavior.
Conserving Earth's biodiversity will require commitment from entire societies, not just conservationist factions. To become "real and important," conservation must be integrated into most citizens' daily lives (Leopold 1991) . Such integration could take many forms in industrial society. Policies to control ecological variation might be reformulated to manage human behavior to accommodate or facilitate natural variation (Holling & Meffe 1996; Haeuber & Michener 1998) . Environmental costs might be fully included in cost-benefit analyses of economic activities (Loomis 1995; Moyle & Moyle 1995) , and effects on ecological sustainability might assume a greater weight in the process of approving activities (Callicott & Mumford 1997) . More radically, burdens of proof might be shifted from requiring regulators to demonstrate that ecosystem alterations have consequences to requiring users to demonstrate that alterations have no consequences. Finally, biologists might assume a greater role in informing ecological policies, including showing the effects of human activities on ecosystem value and recommending ways to live sustainably.
Technology is a double-edged sword for conservation. Some technology causes the ecosystem alterations responsible for biodiversity loss, and unwarranted faith in techno-fixes for ecological problems impedes development of more creative and complete solutions (Orr 1994) . But technology is inherently neither destructive nor constructive; it is merely a tool of prevailing values (Callicott 1989b) . Society cannot reject technology outright, but it can choose which applications to embrace or disallow (Ferkiss 1993) . Some applications may remedy the adverse effects of other applications. Conservation technology such as prescribed burns and exotic species management sacrifices naturalness in degree of control (my criterion 2) for enhanced naturalness in other criteria, such as degree of change, spatial extent, and abruptness.
Alternative Imperatives for Conservation
Conservationists need basic rules by which to judge the desirability of ecosystem alterations and the conservation-worthiness of various biotic elements. Such judgments are best based on what is natural for the area of interest. If naturalness is an inappropriate conservation imperative (Haila 1997; Comer 1997) , however, then we must find another. Below, I critique several alternatives.
Valued qualities such as beauty, complexity, and productivity are common to all biotic elements, but none provides a suitable conservation imperative because each can be enhanced by humans. For example, engineering of greater efficiency, order, and productivity in ecosystems is a primary activity of agriculturists (Dubos 1973) . Enhancing some features (e.g., order, productivity) at the expense of others (e.g., soil stability, habitat complexity) commonly causes biodiversity loss. If qualities such as diversity, efficiency, or productivity determine conservation-worthiness, natural elements will often be overlooked in favor of artificial elements, and every spliced gene, contrived community, and industrialized landscape will vie for limited conservation resources. Such a program would be more like cultural preservation than biological conservation and would fail to protect what conservationists value most.
Other potential imperatives are related to evolution and ecosystem function, but upon close examination these are also founded on naturalness. Comer's (1997) central concern is "protecting the process of evolution." But we do not desire the fastest (or slowest) possible rates of evolution. Don't we strive to conserve natural rates of evolution? Similarly, Haila (1997) wants "to prevent the deterioration of the global ecosystem," and Comer refers to "destructive" and "positive" ecological effects of humans. Both views imply a preferred ecological benchmark. Evolutionary and ecological processes occur regardless of human actions; we change only their rates and controlling factors (Haila & Levins 1992) . What rates do conservationists prefer? If not natural rates, is there an objective basis for assessing the deterioration of processes or for distinguishing the destructive and positive effects of humans? The least ambiguous benchmark is that of no human influence (Hunter 1996) . Conservation is not in crisis because species and communities are disappearing, but because they are disappearing at rates so unnaturally high. If conservationists reject natural rates and controlling factors as the most appropriate targets for evolutionary and ecological processes, then any rates and factors could become management targets, and conservation will degenerate to a hodgepodge discipline.
Although naturalness has shortcomings, such as our inability to always distinguish the natural from the anthropogenic, it is the most reasonable imperative available for conservation and is widely applied in current concepts. Naturalness is the foundation for conceptions of ecological integrity (Karr 1991; Woodley et al. 1993; Angermeier & Karr 1994) , the maintenance of which is the main goal of sustainable resource management (Lubchenco et al. 1991) . Naturalness is also a key concept for ecological restoration ( Jordan et al. 1987; Angermeier 1997) and evolutionarily significant units (Waples 1995) . Protocols to quantify differences between natural and anthropogenic conditions are especially well developed for lotic ecosystems (e.g., Karr et al. 1986; Richter et al. 1996) . A more robust imperative may be forthcoming, but for now naturalness and its attendant concepts offer the most compelling guidance for sustainable management of biotic resources.
Implications for Conservation Biology
Conceptions of naturalness have important implications for the practice of biological conservation and for its development as a scientific discipline. Naturalness provides an objective standard by which to judge the permissibility of ecosystem alteration and the appropriateness of conservation efforts. Reliable assessments of naturalness could help in setting conservation goals and priorities. Conservationists should continue to refine their ability to distinguish between the natural and the anthropogenic, including documentation of causes and extent of biodiversity loss. Natural disturbance regimes are essential models for how fires, floods, and timber harvest can be managed to retain biotic diversity. Given our meager understanding of ecosystem operation, the most prudent conservation strategy is for the intensity, extent, and frequency of human alterations to mimic those of natural regimes (Hunter 1990; Haila & Levins 1992; Hunter 1993) . Emulation of natural dynamics in modified ecosystems will continue to be a key research topic.
The ecological distinctness of humans does not imply that conservation should focus on partitioning ecosystems between reserves and areas of intensive human use. Reserves, especially large ones, are critical to conservation (Redford & Richter 1999) , but the idea that they are sufficient to conserve biodiversity aggravates society's ecological disconnectedness and trivializes the role of natural ecosystems in sustaining society. Moreover, reserves are insufficient conservation solutions because many human effects (e.g., air pollution) cannot be fenced out and because the large areas needed to accommodate natural ecological dynamics are virtually never appropriated. Rather, a conservation ethic dictates some stewardship for all ecosystems because they all have (or had) natural components deserving respect (Plumwood 1998) . Establishing reserves does not abrogate society's stewardship responsibility for unreserved areas. Thus, conservation programs should be coordinated at regional scales and should include "working" landscapes as integral components (Western 1989; Saberwal 1996) . Responsible stewardship emerges only when humans view themselves as integral parts of ecosystems (Comer 1997) . To become a cohesive part of an ecosystem we must minimize the disruptive effects of technology and let that ecosystem operate naturally.
Conservationists have long debated what exactly ought to be conserved and which principles ought to guide conservation policy. Given the current focus on conserving biodiversity, naturalness is the most reasonable imperative for deciding how much diversity should be conserved, which elements should contribute to that diversity, and where those elements should occur. To contribute significantly to environmental policy, conservationists will need to reach a consensus on their primary goals and fundamental values and clearly communicate them to society. If there is a more compelling imperative, we must articulate it. Otherwise, let us get on with the critical but thorny business of convincing others that natural ecosystems often are more valuable than artificial ones.
Biological conservation depends on the ecological behavior of human societies. Because value-based policies limit conservation success more than does biological knowledge (Meffe & Viederman 1995; Wagner 1996) , the most crucial task facing conservationists is facilitating shifts in societal values toward more respect for nature. Such facilitation includes making ecological knowledge comprehensible to the public and connecting it to their deep-seated values (Norton 1998) , and creating opportunities for the pubic to reconnect ecologically via hands-on participation in conservation programs (Higgs 1991) . To be effective, conservationists will need to openly profess their values and persuade others that natural biotic diversity contributes significantly to the quality of human lives. Much of nature as we know it hinges on our success in these endeavors.
